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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WOODEY B. SEARLE and VONETTA ) 
SEARLE, RANDY B. SEARLE and ) 
VICKIE SEARLE, RANCE W. SEARLE) 
and GAIL SEARLE, RHETT A. ) 
SEARLE and TONY SEARLE, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
v. 
LONNIE JOHNSON and the 
HUMANE SOCIETY OF UTAH, 
) 
) 
) ) 
) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents.) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
No. 17349 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants brought this action seeking compensation for 
damages caused to Appellants' businesses by the intentional, 
false and malicious statements and actions of the Defendants 
when the Defendants launched a campaign to keep tourists 
from patronizing businesses in Vernal, Utah, in an unlawful 
attempt to force certain actions by local government of-
ficials. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court ruled, before trial, by way of 
summary judgment, that Defendants' deliberate efforts to 
destroy Plaintiffs' businesses were absolutely privileged 
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because of the right to petition protection of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that 
such attacks were motivated by Defendants' hope that Plain-
tiffs and others so attacked would be forced to demand 
certain concessions desired by Defendants of the public 
officials of the community where Plaintiffs reside. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have this Court reverse the summary 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1975 and 1976, Defendant The Humane Society of Utah 
of Salt Lake City, an affiliate of the national organiza-
tion, and its director, Defendant Lonnie Johnson, a resident 
of Salt Lake City, attempted to convince the elected of-
ficials in Uintah County, Utah and Vernal City to make ex-
tensive changes in the animal control facility owned by 
those entities. Defendants also approached the Uintah 
County Attorney and the Attorney General of the State of 
Utah seeking criminal prosecution of the political entities, 
the Vernal City Councilmen and the Uintah County Commis-
sioners. (R. 132-137 with attached exhibits) The political 
entities informed the Defendants that all the changes re-
quested would not be made at that particular time, and that 
part of the reasons given for the desired changes were based 
on false information. The Uintah County Attorney and the 
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Attorney General's office found no violation of the laws of 
the State of Utah and refused to bring any legal action. 
When the Defendants failed to obtain the changes they desired 
in the animal control facility, the Defendants expressly and 
openly set out to destroy selected businesses in Vernal by 
keeping tourists from visiting Eastern Utah, in particular, 
Dinosaur land in Vernal, Utah. The Defendants'~ theory was 
that if enough economic damage could be caused to certain 
businesses, the owners of those businesses would be forced 
to join with Defendants in extracting from City and County 
government officials concessions which the Defendants had 
been unable to obtain through the usual processes of in-
fluencing government by reason or persuasion and through 
court action. (R. 191-192, 228) The Defendants launched a 
campaign on radio and television as well as newspapers and 
magazines using both local and national media. A large 
billboard was also placed along the freeway in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R. 107, 132-136) Defendants' target was 
tourist businesses and their campaign embodied statements 
which Defendants knew were untrue but which would attract 
great attention and result in national recognition for 
Defendants. (R. 132, 228, 230) 
The Plaintiffs, ranchers in Uintah County, own a 
travel agency, restaurant, motel and gift shop in Vernal, 
Utah. The Plaintiffs are not involved in or connected with 
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the subject of the controversy between the Defendants and 
City and County officials, nor do they have any special 
relationship or influence with those officials. Plaintiffs 
do spend money advertising in the same markets Defendants 
chose to enter with its false and misleading campaign against 
Plaintiffs. As a result of the Defendants' actions, the 
Plaintiffs' businesses suffered a large reduction in tourist 
trade and income starting in 1976. To stop the actions 
taken by Defendants, the Plaintiffs filed this action seeking 
injunctive relief and to recover those losses. (R. 6-10) Soon 
after the complaint was filed, the Defendants, realizing the 
wrongfulness of their actions, removed the billboard and 
ceased their media attack. Plaintiffs now seek to be com-
pensated for their __ losses. 
The Plaintiffs' complaint includes the following alle-
gations: 
Paragraph No. 8, Third Amended Complaint: 
Defendants, Lonnie Johnson and The Humane Society 
of Utah, have maliciously and unlawfully published 
false and misleading statements about and concern-
ing Vernal, Utah, Uintah County, Utah, and Dinosaur-
land in eastern Utah, for the purpose and with the 
intent that such adverse publicity will keep 
tourists and other persons away from Vernal, Utah, 
and injure Plaintiffs' tourist business and the 
tourist business of other persons in Dinosaurland. 
Paragraph No. 9, Third Amended Complaint: 
The malicious, false and misleading statements 
published by the Defendants included a campaign 
conducted by the Defendants commencing in the 
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month of February, 1976, wherein the Defendants 
intentionally attempted to dissuade tourists and 
other persons from traveling to Dinosaurland where 
such persons would use the tourist facilities and 
services operated by Plaintiffs. 
Paragraph No. 13, Third Amended Complaint: 
Defendants, by publication of the statements re-
ferred to above and their conducting the above-
referred . .to_ campaign .to .keep tourists_ out of 
Dinosaurland, have without justification inten-
tionally inflicted harm to Plaintiffs' businesses. 
Paragraph No. 14, Third Amended Complaint: 
The acts performed by the Defendants constitute 
unjustified intentional infliction of harm to 
Plaintiffs' businesses, interference::with pros-
pective advantage in Plaintiffs' businesses, 
injurious falsehood affecting Plaintiffs' busi-
nesses, interference with patronage of Plaintiffs' 
businesses and unlawful restraint of trade, and 
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for the damages 
caused to them thereby. 
Paragraph No. 16, Third Amended Complaint; 
Defendants' statements, actions .and motives are 
willful, malicious, intentional and false. 
Paragraph No. 17, Third Amended Complaint: 
The statements made by Defendants were made by 
Defendants knowing said statements were false or 
in reckless disregard of the truth. (R. 465) 
Upon the filing of Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendants 
irrnnediately removed the case from the Fourth District Court 
of Utah to the Federal District Court for Utah. One of the 
arguments made by Defendants in support of the removal was 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that a state court injunction and damages were being sought 
"for conduct fully protected by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution." (R. 25, 69) Plaintiffs moved 
the Federal District Court to remand the case to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah, arguing that the acts 
performed by Defendants were cormnon torts and that only 
after the Utah courts define those torts and prescribe their 
elements will it be known whether a federal or Constitu-
tional issue exists. Judge Willis W. Ritter remanded the 
case to the Utah District Court and ordered that: 
this case was improperly removed to this Court in 
that the complaint herein does not present a claim 
or right arising under the Constitution, treaties 
or laws of the United States. (R. 61, 63) 
The Defendants then filed an action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, asserting that this action in the 
State Court should be enjoined since the acts of Defendants 
complained of in Plaintiffs' complaint were privileged under 
the First Amendment. On September 6, 1976, Judge Ritter 
dismissed that action on the pleadings, once again holding 
that the complaint alleged a cormnon law tort.(R. 205) 
Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment in 
this case claiming the actions of Defendants complained 
about were privileged under the First Amendment. Both 
parties briefed the issues fully and on December 21, 1977, 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Judge Allen B. Sorensen denied that motion. (R. 245) 
The case having been set for trial before the Honorable 
David Sam, the Defendants, once again by a motion for sum-
mary judgment, raised the defense that their actions were 
absolutely privileged by the First Amendment right to peti-
tion. On July 29, 1980, Judge Sam granted the Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment ruling that even if all the 
allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint were considered to 
be true, the Defendants' actions were absolutely privileged 
by the First Amendment right to petition. (R. 1) (It 
should be noted that the trial judge signed two orders 
granting the motion for summary judgment. (R. 1, 4) The 
order prepared by Defendants' counsel (R.4) was prepared 
first and furnished to the Court. A telephone conference 
call was held and it was agreed by the Court and counsel 
that the order prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel (R. l) set 
forth more clearly the trial court's ruling and should be 
the order signed and filed by the judge. The trial judge 
erroneously signed and filed both orders granting Defendants' 
Motion For Summary Judgment.) It is from that summary 
judgment that Defendants appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ALLEGES FACTS WHICH, 
WHEN PROVEN AT TRIAL, CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE ENTITLING 
THEM TO COMPENSATION FOR THEIR DAMAGES. 
It has long been recognized that every person has the 
right to engage in lawful business. Freedom of enterprise 
is one of the cornerstones of our democratic society. The 
protection of one's means of livelihood is just as important 
as the protection of the physical integrity of his personal 
property. The success or failure of a person's business 
often depends upon the reputation the business enjoys with 
potential customers. Thus, terms like reputation, good will 
and respect are very important and large amounts of money 
are spent to establish them. Good will is hard to come by 
and easy to destroy. See, Green, et al., Torts, 835, 866 
(1968). 
Because of the value of good will and the right to 
pursue a business free from unjustified interference, the 
common law has developed ways of protecting business in-
terests. At a very early date, it was recognized that a 
party has a right to pursue a business free from unjustified 
interference. See, Garrett v. Taylor, 79 Eng. Rep. 485, 
involving threats of mayhem and vexatious suits against 
customers and workmen; and, Tarleton v. McGawley, 170 Eng. 
Rep. 153 (1793) where the defendant fired upon African 
natives with whom the plaintiff was about to trade. The 
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1 
American courts slowly followed the English courts and began 
to recognize the right to be free from interference in 
economic dealings. The case of Evenson v. Spauling, 150 F. 
517 (1907), is a good example. In that case, plaintiff had 
a wagon company and his salesmen would travel throughout the 
State of Washington selling wagons. Wherever the salesmen 
would go, they were followed by two or three of defendant's 
agents. When the salesmen engaged in conversations with 
potential customers, defendant's agents would interrupt and 
advise the customers not to buy, and to prevent trouble, 
many customers refused to buy. The court, in sustaining an 
injunction prohibiting defendant from following plaintiff's 
salesmen, said: 
While the appellees (plaintiffs) have no right to 
protection against competition, they have the 
right to protection against wanton and malicious 
interference and annoyance. 
The case of Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, 
65 A. 165 (1906), was one of the first cases to recognize 
liability for tortious interference with prospective eco-
d nomic advantage. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court said: 
[I]n a civilized community which recognizes the 
right of private property among its institutions, 
the notion is intolerable that a man should be 
protected by the law in the enjoyment of property 
once it is acquired, but left unprotected by the 
law is his effort to acquire it ... 
It seems logical that as a state recognizes the right to be 
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free from interference with contracts entered into, the 
state also ought to give some protection for future con-
tractual relations. 
Today it is well recognized throughout the United 
States that interference with an individual's business is a 
compensable tort. Prosser refers to the tort as "intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage." Prosser, 
Torts, §130 at 649 (4th Ed.). Harper & James calls the 
tort, "interference with reasonable economic expectations." 
Harper & James, Torts, §6.11 at 510 (1956). The Proposed 
Restatement of Torts 2d, §766(B) defines the tort as fol-
lows: 
§766(B) Intentional Interference with Pros ective 
Contractua Re ation. 
Onewhointentionally-and improperly-interferes 
with-another's prospective contractual relation is 
subject to liability to the other for the pecuni-
ary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of 
the relation, whether the interference consists 
of: 
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person 
not to enter into or continue their prospective 
relation, or 
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or con-
tinuing the prospective relation. 
Regardless of the name given to the tort, the courts 
and counnentators generally agree that the elements of the 
tort are: 
(1) the present or probable future existence of a 
contract, business relations or business expectancy 
beneficial to the injured person; 
(2) knowledge of the contract, relations or ex-
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pectancy on the part of the interferer; 
(3) intentional interference which induces or 
causes a termination of the contract or fore-
closure of the business relations or expectancy; 
and, 
(4) resultant damages. Expanding Horizons in the 
Law of Torts - Tortious Interference, 23 Duke L. 
Rev. 341, 343 (1974). 
While the Utah Supreme Court appears never to have 
directly faced the application of the doctrine of inten-
tional interference with prospective economic advantage, 
there are three reasons why the Court should recognize the 
tort: (1) The same policy reasons that call for the pro-
tection of contract call for protection of the right to seek 
future contracts; (2) All of the Western States that have 
considered the problem have recognized the tort; and, (3) 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that it will recognize 
the tort. 
There is dictum in two Utah cases that suggest the tort 
will be recognized. The first case is Soter v. Wasatch 
Development Corp., 21 Ut.2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 (1968). The 
case involved an allegation of interference with contract by 
defendant. The court said: 
In order to establish a right to recover on such a 
cause of action the plaintiffs would have to show 
that the defendants, without justification, by 
some wrongful or malicious act, interfered with 
the plaintiff's right of contract and that actual 
damages resulted. Id. at 664. 
The second case was Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., 
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Inc., 14 Ut.2d 291, 383 P.2d 402 (1965). In that case, 
plaintiff had a writing which, he had alleged, gave him 
exclusive right to transport all the milk certain farmers 
produced. Defendant persuaded the farmers to let him ship 
their milk at a lower rate. The trial court found that the 
plaintiff's agreement with the farmers was not an exclusive 
contract, but merely provided for payment to plaintiff in 
the event that the farmers used his services to deliver milk 
and entered a summary judgment on that basis. The Supreme 
Court remanded to determine if defendant had intentionally 
interfered with plaintiff's business. The court ordered the 
case submitted tc: 
[T]he jury for determination of whether Federated, 
in urging its members who had conven:ed to tank 
method to use only its transportation services, 
did so to further its legitimate business in ~rests 
or had unjustifiably persuaded its members not to 
use Gammon's services so as to enable ic to ±:ix 
minimum prices for milk ... Id. at 405-406. 
Five of Utah's neighboring states that have considered 
the issue reco~nize the rort. In the case of Buckaloo v. 
The great V:·c i;:hr of authr-,Yi tv is <,cc the ~::i:-c of 
i:-i~E-:::ferc::.:1ce -:.1 ith conLrc-c: ::__ - PLe--:"E.'., c.t spc:.cie-s of 
t. 1'-e 1:_r.~,adr~~ 1...:cLt ~f ir-tr.:rfe~er1ce -1 .. ~~-::.r. ~~J:O:=T,;:::cti\ie 
ecc:-io::::lic dG.var.-c:.a.;e. (ci-::=c:tior . .::- C71ii:-.. ,~--> TI.:L.s 
while the el_err,ents of the two ac+:ions ctre similar, 
the 2x:· st·~:i:ice 2' :i. le,~_.:::.~_:_-- .:_.~.3 -- :=i.~_:._-ee...-l'·f'-it is 
710t a~~~-]~.~~:__~~ ~C· t~·,.: ---~--
based on the mor~ inclusive wrong 
-12 
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The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment based on the grounds that there was no contract. 
The Supreme Court reversed saying that the existence of a 
contract was not a prerequisite for the action. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court said in a case involving a 
dispute between-two competing gas companies as-to the -
quality of pipe used by one of the companies: 
[O]ne has the right to carry on and prosecute a 
lawful business in which he is engaged without 
unlawful molestation or unjustified interference 
from any person, and any malicious interference 
with such business is an unlawful act and an 
actionable wrong. Crystal Gas Co. v. Oklahoma 
Natural Gas Co., 529 P.2d 987, 989 (Ok. 1974). 
In the case, the plaintiff failed to prove that the state-
ments by the defendant were the proximate cause of the 
damages-sustained by the plaintiff. 
In Pre-Fit Door, Inc. v. Dor-Ways, Inc., 13-Ariz.App. 
438, 477 P.2d 557 (1970), the Arizona Supreme Court said: 
The intentional and unjustified third party 
interference with valid contractual relations or 
business expectancies constitutes an actionable 
tort recognized in this State. (citations omitted) 
The tort has been crystalized and defined in 
Restatement of Torts §766 (followed by a quotation 
of the Restatement). Id. at 559. 
The actual case dealt with a contract and the facts are 
not relevant to the present case. 
The Oregon Supreme Court in Luisi v. Bank of Commerce, 
449 P.2d 441 (Or. 1969), recognized the tort. In that case, 
Oscar Pollard and Ray Powell were partners in an automobile 
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dealership. Powell served notice that he wanted to termin-
ate the business. Pollard agreed to buy him out. Plaintiff 
alleged that Pollard agreed to accept him as an equal part-
ner in return for plaintiff providing the money to buy out 
Powell. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant bank interfered 
with·the contract between himself and Pollard: The court 
said that there was no contract between plaintiff and Pol-
lard, but: 
We do not mean to indicate that it is necessary, 
in all cases, that there actually be a contract in 
existence before a third party can be held res-
ponsible for interference. A third party can be 
held responsible for interference with a business 
interest even though the arrangement entered into 
does not rise to the dignity of a contract. See, 4 
Restatement of Torts §766(b). Id. at 443. -
The court, however, held that-the plaintiff was limited to 
proving the existence of the contract because .he had alleged 
interference with contract~in his complaint. 
In Scymanski v. Dufault, 80 Wash.2d 77, 491 P.2d 1050 
(1972), Washington recognized the tort of intentional inter-
ference with prospective economic advantage. 
The allegations of the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Com-
plaint sets forth all the elements needed for a prima ~ 
case of intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage. Those allegations are further supported by the 
affidavits and discovery in the case. The Defendants have 
admitted that the Plaintiffs had a future prospective busi-
ness relationship with tourists visiting the area and that 
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the Defendants intentionally interfered with that rela-
tionship. The Defendants, however, claim that even though 
their actions constituted all the elements of a prima facie 
case for intentional interference with prospective contract 
or economic advantage, that their actions were absolutely 
privileged under the First Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States. The trial court, in agreeing with the 
Defendants, erred and the case should be returned to the 
District Court for a determination of the facts resulting in 
the tort and for a determination of whether justification or 
privilege exists in light of those facts. 
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POINT II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ABSO-
LUTE PRIVILEGE TO COMMIT THE COMMON LAW TORT 
OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE 
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE AND, THEREFORE, THE CASE 
SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT SO 
THAT THE TRIER OF FACT CAN DETERMINE, AFTER 
HEARING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, WHETHER THE DE-
FENDANTS' ACTIONS WERE JUSTIFIED, PROPER OR 
PRIVILEGED. 
A. This Court should set forth those elements which 
Defendants must .establISh to_ _claim a -.First Amend-
ment rivile e and then remand the case to a 
jury or a consi eration o t e acts to eter-
mine whether the Defendants' actions were privileged. 
It -is elementary Constitutional law that while the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
guarantees citizens certain of the most important rights 
known to man in a free society, there are certain actions 
which, although they may involve speech or efforts to in-
fluence government action, are not Constitutionally pro-
tected-. _ Miller v. California,-: .413 ·u :s ;- 15 (197:3)-; Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Lehman v·;. Shaker Heights, 
418 U.S. 298 (1974); Zacchinni v. Scrips-Howard Broadcasting, 
433 U.S. 562 (1977); and, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 
448 (1976). The Court has identified at least four cate-
gories of expression: commercial speech, Valentine v. 
Chrestgreen, 316 U.S. 52 (1944); libel, Gertz v. Welch, 418 
U.S. 323 (1974); obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973); and, fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568 (1942), which may be directly regulated by the 
State without necessarily contravening First Amendment 
guarantees. Also, such acts as kidnapping and the holding 
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of hostages for the purposes of influencing the actions of 
government are obviously not protected by the Constitution 
but actually criminal. 
Unlike other areas of intentional torts such as injury 
to person or property or defamation, the branch of tort law 
dealing with unjustified, intentional interference with a_ 
prospective business relation has not developed a crystalized 
set of definite rules as to the existence or non-existence 
of privilege. See, Proposed Restatement of Torts 2d, §767, 
comment (b). Rather the law on this subject has tradition~ 
ally been expressed in terms of whether the interference is 
improper rather than in terms of whether there is a specific 
privilege to act in a particular manner. The issue in each 
case is whether the interference is improper under the 
circumstances; whether upon a consideration of the relative 
significance of the factors involved, the conduct should be 
permitted without liability, despite the effect of harm to 
another. The decision depends upon a judgment and choice of 
values in each situation. See, Proposed Restatement of 
Torts 2d, §769 - §773. None of the previously identifiable 
situations, which have been found proper or justifiable, 
relate to the kind of activities engaged in by the Res-
pondents in this action. The trial court in this case held 
that even if the Plaintiffs were able to prove the truth-
fulness of each of the allegations of their complaint at 
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trial, Defendants are entitled to judgment dismissing the 
complaint as a matter of law since Defendants' actions were 
absolutely privileged by the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. To hold the Defendants are 
iIIll!lune under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States when called upon to respond for damages caused 
by untrue and malicious statements, confers an absolute 
privilege, regardless of the tortious nature of the activity. 
The decision of the District Court below merely assumed 
without any analysis that the Defendants' actions were 
themselves an exercise of First Amendment rights. It is 
appropriate for the Court to decide what factors can con-
stitute privileged conduct and then to submit the issue of 
whether_ the_Defendants' conduct was privileged under the 
particular_fa~tual situati~n to the jury under proper 
instructions. It is not appropriate for the Court to decide 
as a matter of-law what is privileged and whether the 
privilege exists in a given case where there are factual 
controversies. Unless it can be said that the First Amend-
ment right of free speech guarantees Defendants an absolute 
right to intentionally and maliciously, by use of false and 
misleading statements, destroy Plaintiffs' businesses, the 
District Court erred in granting Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment and should be reversed. 
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B. Missouri v. N.O.W. did not establish a category 
of expression absolutely protected by the Con-
stitution and the trial court erred in rel in on 
Missouri v. N.0.W. to create an a solute privi-
lege. 
The trial court held that under the case of Missouri 
v. N.0.W., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
U.S. (1980), the Defendants have an absolute privilege 
for their actions. Such a holding means that Defendants' 
actions were privileged even though they were intentional 
and malicious, and some of the statements made were false 
and made with an intent to cause injury to third party 
businesses which had no relationship with the political 
entity that the Defendants were trying to influence. The 
Court's reliance on Missouri v. N.O.W. for such a broad 
privilege is misplaced. This Court is not-bound by the 
holding of Missouri v. N.0.W. and, even if it were, it is 
distinguishable, both legally and factually, from the 
present ~ase. Furthermore, the ruling in Missouri v. N.O.W. 
did not purport to grant an absolute privilege and the 
holding of the District Court in this case goes further than 
the Missouri v. N.O.W. court. 
The case of Missouri v. N.0.W. and the cases on which 
that decision is premised are anti-trust cases. They are 
not cases which involve typical facts involving the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage 
as do the facts in the present case. As the 8th Circuit 
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Court of Appeals pointed out in Missouri v. N.0.W.: 
(T]he primary question with which we must deal is 
the applicability of the Sherman Act to a politi-
cally motivated but economically tooled boycott 
participated in and organized by non-competitors 
of those who suffer as a result of the boycott. 
Missouri v. N.0.W. at 1302. 
The trial court and the appellate court in Missouri v. 
N.0.W. treated the case as an anti-trust case in determining 
whether the Sherman Act was applicable. Very little effort 
was expended by either court in considering the common law 
tort. The consideration that was given to the tort claim was 
premised on anti-trust law. The court in Missouri v. N.O.W. 
found that the boycott organized by N.0.W. was privileged 
because of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In Eastern 
Railroads President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the-Sherman Act does not apply to_activities which 
comprise the mere solicitation of government action with 
respect to passage and enforcement of laws. That decision 
was affirmed in United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 
381 U.S. 657 (1965), when the court held that the First 
Amendment privilege existed even if the defendant's motive 
was to curtail competition. Both the Noerr and Pennington 
cases recognized that the First Amendment privilege was not 
absolute. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the court held that the 
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Noerr-Pennington First Amendment privilege was not absolute 
and that it could not be used as a means or pretext for 
achieving substantial evils or abusing the administrative 
and judicial processes. 
The courts, while recognizing the great protection 
which must be given to the First Amendment rights, have 
never held that those rights are absolute and that a person 
has an absolute right to intentionally harm innocent parties 
or businesses in the exercise of those First Amendment 
rights. See, ~. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U.S. 507 (1976); Zacchinni v. Scrips-Howard Broadcasting 
~. 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 
448 (1976); Garnett Co._, J:nc .. v. DeP.asqual, 443 U.S.: 368n 
(1979); and, Gertz v. Welch, 418 -U.S. 323 (1974). The trial 
court's holding that the Defendants' statements and actions 
were privileged even though they were false, malicious and 
done in an attempt to intentionally harm the Plaintiffs 
expanded the protection of the First Amendment rights further 
than any decision of the U. S. Supreme Court. The trial 
court's ruling appears to put no limitations on what a party 
can do, as long as he claims that his actions are politi-
cally motivated. The ruling would seem to legitimatize the 
actions of the nation of Iran in its holding of United 
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States' citizens as hostages in an attempt to influence the 
actions of the United States Government. The Defendants' 
actions, on a smaller scale, were very similar in that the 
Defendants attempted to place in hostage the local businesses, 
including the Plaintiffs, in an attempt to influence the 
actions of Vernal City and,Uintah County. The First Amend-
ment rights, though precious, were never intended to allo~ 
an individual to intentionally harm a person or his business 
on the premise that he was trying to achieve political 
changes. 
Missouri v. N.O.W. is also factually distinguishable 
from the present case. In that case the plaintiff was a 
government entity whose political actions the defendant was 
trying_ to in£luence by boycott. In the present case, the 
Plaintiffs are businessmen involved in running .a _motel, cafe 
and gift shop, which businesses depend upon the tourist 
business for a =Bizeable portion --of their income. The Plain-
tiffs are not officials of Vernal City or Uintah County and 
have no control over the political decisions made by either 
of those entities. The Defendants initiated a secondary 
boycott against the Plaintiffs intending to harm the busi-
nesses of the Plaintiffs and then claimed their actions were 
privileged. The claim of a First Amendment privilege in 
such a factual situation is not warranted. The Defendants 
have many lawful avenues open to them by which they could 
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petition the local government entities to seek desired 
changes in the dog pound. Instead of using those lawful 
methods, the Defendants intentionally harmed the Plaintiffs 
and other businesses which have no control over the politi-
cal decisions made. To allow a First Amendment privilege in 
such a factual setting was surely not contemplated by-the 
framers of the First Amendment nor has it been recognized by 
the courts. 
The present case is further distinguishable from the 
Missouri case in that in Missouri, the government entity 
that the defendants were trying to influence was the State 
of Missouri, while the present case involves county and city 
governments. The law recognizes varying degrees of privilege 
depending on what level of government is involved. See, 
In Re Airport Car Rental Anti-trust Litigation, 474 F.Supp. 
1072 (1979). (Cf. the distinction between public figures 
and private individuals in the defamation cases.) Furthermore, 
there is a vast difference between the changes the defen-
dants in each case desired to have made. In the Missouri 
case, the defendants were attempting to have the State of 
Missouri and other states pass legislation ratifying an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, while in 
the present case the Defendants were attempting to punish 
local government officials because of past operations of an 
animal control facility. Grave doubts can be raised whether 
the activities engaged in by Defendants constitute exercise 
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of First Amendment rights and whether the actions sought to 
be extracted by Defendants were even political in nature. 
To allow an organization such as the Humane Society of Utah 
to cause intentional and malicious injury to businessmen 
such as the Plaintiffs, who have no control over political 
decisions, in an attempt by that organization and its 
directors to force its personal desires upon local political 
entities, is wrong. The courts have long recognized that it 
is wrong and have developed the coIIUllon law tort of inten-
tional interference with prospective economic advantage 
allowing the plaintiff to recover damages it incurred as a 
result of that wrong. The holding by the trial court that 
the Defendants' actions were absolutely privileged even 
though false, malicious and done with a wilful intent to 
harm the Plaintiffs, compounds the wrong the Plaintiffs have 
suffered. The abandoning of the common law tort which would 
rectify the wrong done to the Plaintiffs and the finding of 
such a broad privilege by the trial court was clearly er-
roneous and the case should be remanded for trial so that a 
jury can hear the facts and determine whether a privilege 
exists. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY 
DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT WITHOUT 
ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT DEFENDANTS' 
CAMPAIGN TO DESTROY PLAINTIFFS' BUSINESS 
CONSISTED OF FALSE AND MISLEADING STATE-
MENTS PUBLISHED INTENTIONALLY AND MALICI-
OUSLY AND WITHOUT LEGAL JUSTIFICATION. 
The case is before the Court on appeal from a summary 
judgment granted by the trial court to the Defendants. A 
motion for sunnnary judgment should be granted only when the 
pleadings, depositions, admissions, other discovery, and the 
affidavits show without dispute that the party seeking 
sUIIDI1ary judgment is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Ut.2d 280; 391 P.2d 426 (1964). The 
trial court, in deciding whether to grant a motion for 
summary judgment, must consider the pleadings, depositions, 
etc., in a light favorable ~o the party opposing the motion 
for summary judgment and all doubts must be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 
1332 (Ut. 1977); Foster v. Steed, 19 Ut.2d 435; 432 P.2d 60 
(1967). Only if it appears to a certainty that the Plain-
tiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
facts, even if all the facts alleged by the Plaintiff were 
held to be true, should a motion for summary judgment be 
granted. Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1975); 
Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Ut. 1979). 
The trial court in granting the Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment had before it the pleadings, extensive 
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discovery, affidavits and prior court rulings, together with 
the extensive legal memoranda of the parties. The Plain-
tiffs' Third Amended Complaint alleged that the Defendants 
had maliciously and unlawfully published false and mislead-
ing statements for the purpose and with the intent to injure 
the Plaintiffs' business. The allegations of the Plaintiffs' 
Third Amended Complaint were supported by the discovery, 
affidavits and legal memoranda. The trial court after 
having reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, discovery and the 
legal memoranda held that even if the Plaintiffs were able 
to prove the truthfulness of each of their allegations at 
trial, the Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law because their actions were privileged under the First 
Amendment right to petition. It is the position of the 
Plaintiff that there does not exist an absolute First Amend-
ment privilege to the tort of interference with prospective 
economic advantage and, therefore, the case should be re-
manded for trial so that the trier of fact can determine, 
after hearing all of the evidence, whether the Defendants' 
actions were privileged. Soter v. Wasatch Development Cor£·• 
21 Ut.2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 (1968); In Re Airport Car Rental 
Anti-trust Litigation, 474 F.Supp. 1079 (1979); Restatement 
of Torts 2d, §767; Political Boycott Activity and The First 
Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 659 (1978). 
The Court's granting of the Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment without a trial was error and deprived 
Plaintiffs of their right to present the facts to the jury 
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for a determination of whether Defendants' actions were 
proper, justified or privileged. Only a determination that 
intentionally unlawful, false and malicious statements and 
actions have Constitutional protection could justify the 
summary judgment. That such is not a proper rule of law is 
clearly set forth in the section identified as Point II 
of this brief. 
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